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Abstract
We investigate several variants of a network creation model: a
group of agents builds up a network between them while trying to
keep the costs of this network small. The cost function consists of two
addends, namely (i) a constant amount for each edge an agent buys
and (ii) the minimum number of hops it takes sending messages to
other agents. Despite the simplicity of this model, various complex
network structures emerge depending on the weight between the two
addends of the cost function and on the selfish or unselfish behaviour
of the agents.
PACS: 89.75.Hc,89.75.Fb,89.20.Hh,89.65.-s,05.10.Ln
Keywords : optimization, selfish optimization, network, internet, multi agent
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1 Introduction
The Internet, which has changed computing by making access to informa-
tion and to computing resources available to the world, is a complex system
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worthy of study in its own right. It came into being through the federation
of many different networks originally designed to serve different purposes for
different communities, and does not have strong central management. At-
tempts to understand its behaviour at the lowest level, that of connectivity
and topography, have shown that the simplest model, a graph in which sites
are connected at random, must be discarded in favor of a graph in which
the distribution of the number of links is very heavy-tailed. Most sites have
very few connections, but there is a power-law tail containing very few, very
highly-connected sites [1]. The earliest maps of the Internet [2] tended to
show a fairly tree-like structure, but these were gathered by searching out
from a single point along shortest paths, producing essentially a minimum
spanning tree to the selected destinations. More extensive searches [3] show
that there are many crosslinks as well. The most recent, detailed studies
of the links between subnetworks, building blocks of the Internet, show an
average connectivity of more than six links per site in addition to power law
tails in the degree distribution [4, 5].
Other networks, like the World Wide Web, networks of actors with joint
movies as edges between them, and various kinds of networks between hu-
mans, exhibit similar properties [1, 6]. Besides these investigations of the
properties of the Internet and of related networks, one is interested in the
basic mechanisms leading to this type of network. The growth and shaping
of a network is a stochastic process of considerable interest, but the lack of
central control makes the use of statistical mechanical models for such com-
plex systems suspect. In fact, such a network appears to be a ”game,” in
which many independent agents manage its components to suit their own
needs. Recent attempts to analyze the implications of this thought [7] have
focused on the ”price of anarchy,” a catchy term given to the ratio of the
cost of the worst-case selfish but stable solution in such a game to the ”social
optimum” in which all players cooperate to produce the best solution for the
system as a whole. This ratio may be a constant, or may increase with N ,
the number of players in the game.
The equilibrium in which each agent has chosen a specific configuration
for the assets that it manages and, given the configurations chosen by the
other agents, has no incentive to change, is called a pure Nash equilibrium
[8]. Even when the social cost is carefully defined to be the sum of the
individual costs which individual players optimize, the social optimum may
not be a Nash equilibrium, if individual incentives destabilize it. Nonetheless,
the search for a pure Nash equilibrium or more generally when the agents’
information or choices are more restricted, a selfish optimum, is a stochastic
process of great interest both as a variation on statistical mechanics, and as
a model of how large complex systems behave in the real world.
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A recent model that we shall consider is ”network creation,” introduced in
[9] and extended to models which represent actual peer-to-peer data sharing
networks formed as overlays in the actual Internet, in [10]. This is the first of
what may be many models in which the differences between selfishly driven
optimization and global optimization can shed light on real-world complex
systems. Determining the full range of possible selfishly optimal behaviour
in such models is at least as difficult as combinatorial optimization, and has
in fact spawned new complexity classes in computer science [11].
2 The Network Creation Model
In the network creation model, one agent is assigned to each node i of the
graph. Each edge between a pair (i, j) of nodes is owned either by the
agent on node i or the agent on node j, but it can be used by any agent
for transferring messages. The cost of sending messages will depend on our
model of message traffic. For simplicity and generality, we shall assume that
each agent must send an equal number of messages (one, without loss of
generality) to all other agents. This uniform model will never generate the
power law tails seen in the real Internet, but it proves to exhibit surprisingly
rich behaviour. It requires that the graph be connected. Thus each agent
must purchase sufficient edges in order to be connected to all other agents, but
as this occurs in an asynchronous parallel process, agents can take advantage
of edges purchased by others. Buying an edge costs an amount α. In this
model, α is simply a constant and does not depend e.g. on the distance
between the nodes i and j or on the required bandwidth for the connection.
The cost of sending each message is given by the number of hops (the number
of links that it passes over) in the shortest path between the sender and the
receiver. The costs of one hop is an arbitrary parameter, such that it is
conveniently set to 1.
If the network is already connected, each agent still has the problem
whether it wants to buy additional edges in order to reduce the costs induced
by the number of hops or to take a larger amount of hops into account in
order to reduce the costs incurred by the edges. The decision to which it
gets at the end depends strongly on the value of α: if α is smaller than 1,
then of course a complete graph with edges between every pair of nodes is
preferrable. However, if α is very large, then the network is surely only a
tree, such that the condition that the graph must be connected is fulfilled
and no edge more than needed is added. The most interesting question for us
is what structures the networks created by the agents have for intermediate
values of α. These structures will not only depend on the value of α but also
3
on the decision of the agents when to buy an additional edge. This decision
depends also on the behaviour of the agents, whether the agents are selfish,
i.e., if they only consider whether their own costs decrease, or not, i.e., if
they consider whether the sum of the costs of all agents decreases.
Related to this behaviour, one can write down cost functions for the single
agents: the cost function of a selfish agent on node i can be written as
Hselfish(i) =
∑
j
agents
(α× ηij + dij) (1)
with ηij = 1 if the agent on node i has bought an edge to node j and 0
otherwise and with dij being the distance between the nodes i and j measured
in hops as described above. Analogously, the cost function of an unselfish
agent on node i is given as
Hunselfish(i) =
∑
j
agents
α× ηij +
∑
k
agents
∑
j
agents
dkj. (2)
Thus, in the unselfish scenario, each agent considers only the costs of the
own links but all the costs induced by the distances.
One can also define an overall cost function for the system which is given
as
Htotal =
∑
i
agents
∑
j
agents
(α× ηij + dij) . (3)
This cost function is independent of the behaviour of the agents: it is identical
with the sum over all selfish cost functions Hselfish(i) of the single agents. But
it is also basically equal to the cost function of an unselfish agent, as each
agent can only make decisions due to the connections they bought on their
own but not on the connections bought by other agents.
In these distances dij , one can also consider the constraint that the graph
has to be connected: the agent on node i adds up the number of hops mes-
sages take to any other node j to which it is directly or indirectly via other
nodes connected and stores this number in the dij. For all other nodes, which
it cannot reach, it sets dij = L with L being a large number. L has to be
larger than α and the maximum possible number of hops in the system to
ensure that the graph will be connected at the end of the simulation.
3 Simulation Details
Simulating this model, one mostly starts with an empty graph without edges
between the nodes, because this is the natural starting point. For comparison,
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additionally to this “from scratch”-scenario we investigate a “from complete”-
scenario in which one starts with a complete graph in which all pairs of
nodes are directly connected via an edge which is randomly owned by one
of the nodes. Whereas the “from scratch”-scenario can be justified by the
historic development, as there were no connections at the beginning, the
“from complete”-scenario can be pictured as if there were a planning meeting
of all agents in which they started with a complete graph und with edges
which were already assigned to them and they determined in a random order
which edges should be removed.
Besides the creation of a starting configuration, a simulation must specify
rules for moves, i.e., a prescription how to change the configuration. An
obvious choice for a move from the point of view of an agent is of course a
buy/sell-move: one chooses a pair (i, j) of nodes at random with i 6= j. If
there is no edge between them, then the agent on node i determines whether
it is preferrable for it to buy an edge to j or not. According to the behaviour
of the agent, it will make its decision. If the situation is improved in its view
by buying an edge then the agent on node i buys an edge to j. However, if
there is already an edge between i and j, then the buy/sell-move asks the
owner of the edge whether it is preferrable for it to remove it. This buy/sell-
move can also be accepted if the costs for the agent stay the same, i.e., if the
move leads to an equally good configuration, as it is anyway nowadays in the
habit of managers to always restruct their companies. If such a restruction
does not lead to any deterioration, it is to be accepted.
Besides this buy/sell-move, which is surely a natural move, one can also
implement a switch-move: here a triple (i, j, k) of nodes is randomly chosen
in the way that the agent on node i owns an edge between i and j and that
there is no edge between i and k. Now the agent on node i is asked whether it
is preferrable to delete the edge to j and to add an edge to k at the same time.
Implementing this additional move might lead to even better configurations,
as the simulation cannot get stuck at configurations anymore which could be
easily improved by this switch-move but not by the successive application of
sell- and buy-moves, as a sequence of these is only accepted if none of these
leads to any deterioration, whereas the corresponding switch-move has only
to consider the remaining part of the sum of the improvements and of the
deteriorations.
After having performed many such moves, the simulation run usually
reaches a configuration which is not changed anymore. In the case of the
unselfish behaviour of the agents, in which the simulation is performed basi-
cally according to the total cost function of the system, the simulations often
end at a local or even the global minimum in the energy landscape. However,
not always such a local minimum is reached due to the ownership of a link:
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an agent can only delete an edge if it is owned by it. Thus, if it is rather
well but not optimally connected because an other agent bought an edge to
it and if it is not advantageous to buy a further edge as the costs for it would
be larger than the savings in the reduction of the distances, it will have to
stay with this locally not optimal situation. The configurations in which
simulation runs end up are some types of local minima. In optimization,
one differentiates between local and global minima: global minima have cost
function values which are optimal for the problem, there is no configuration
at all with a better cost function value. Contrarily, local minima only have a
cost function value which is better than the cost function values of all config-
urations which can be reached by the application of one move from this local
minimum. In the world of Multi Agent Systems, a Nash equilibrium corre-
sponds to the global optimum. We here end up at local minima in which the
simulations get stuck and which cannot be improved by the application of
any move available to an agent. We test for reaching such a local minimum
explicitly. Before stopping the simulation we explore all possible moves that
are available to a single agent. It could also be that a simulation run never
gets stuck in a stable configuration because the system can jump between
equally good configurations.
Thus, we cannot let a simulation run through a possibly infinite loop.
In our implementation, 10000 steps are performed. In each step, first 100
moves are tried in a random way, i.e., the nodes which shall buy, sell, and
switch, rsp., edges and their neighbors are selected at random. If all of
these 100 moves are rejected, then all possibilities for moves are checked
deterministically but in a random order. This shall ensure that in each step
at least one move is accepted. If during this complete search for a move to
be accepted no acceptable move is found, then the simulation run is already
stuck in a local minimum or Nash equilibrium, such that the simulation can
be stopped ahead of time. Otherwise, the simulation proceeds with the next
step.
In our simulations, we either use only the buy/sell-move (b/s) or use
both the buy/sell-move and the switch-move in a random order (b/s+sw)
with equal probability. Furthermore, we either start “from scratch” (fs) or
“from complete” (fc) and the agents exhibit either a selfish or an unselfish
behaviour. Thus, we have all in all eight different scenarios. For each of these
scenarios, we consider several values for α, namely 0.5, 0.7, 1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.7,
2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.7, 3, 3.3, 3.5, 3.7, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 160, 170,
180, 190, 200, 300, 400, and 500. For each scenario and for each value of α,
we performed 100 simulation runs over which the results are averaged.
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Figure 1: Examples of resulting configurations: depending on the value of α,
simulations lead to different interesting final configurations.
4 Computational Results
The final configurations of our simulations strongly depend on the size of
α: obviously, the simulations end in full connected graphs for α < 1, as
buying an edge is cheaper than letting a message perform an additional
hop. Figure 1 shows typical final configurations reached at larger values
of α. Although these examples were found using selfish optimization, from
scratch, similar results are found starting from a complete graph, or using
global optimization. For α = 2, the example graph found is dense, but no
longer complete. For different configurations found at α = 2, the number
of edges in the configurations varies between 99 and 917 with an average of
613. We often get a star with one centre node to which all other nodes are
connected for α = 20. For even larger values of α, the simulations mostly
produce trees which, at first, are close to stars in structure. But also some
rather unexpected structures occur: for α = 10, we often get a structure with
three centre nodes. All other nodes are connected to two of these three centre
nodes. There are two edges between these three nodes, such that messages
need only up to two hops to get from the sender to the receiver. In graph
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theory terms, the solution for intermediate values of alpha maintains the
diameter of the network, the longest shortest path between any two points,
at two hops.
Now we want to study the behaviour of our simulations and the final
configurations statistically.
Figure 2 shows the minimum, mean, and maximum numbers of steps, the
simulations took. Please note that there is a maximum of 10000 steps: if the
simulation has not reached a stable Nash equilibrium or a local minimum, it
breaks after this number of steps. It might be that such a broken simulation
might have ended soon after, but it also might have gone on forever. Fur-
thermore note that the minimum number of steps is always 1: thus, even if
the simulation starts in a Nash equilibrium or a local minimum, such that no
move is accepted, one step is counted. There are indeed simulations which
were started from such minima: as already mentioned, a complete graph
with edges between all pairs of nodes is optimal for α < 1. Thus, if we start
from our “from complete”-scenario for some α < 1, there is no move leading
to any improvement, such that the simulation can already stop at this point.
For selfish agents working on α = 1, we find that the runs are only ended by
the rule that a simulation cannot exceed 10000 steps. Here many neighbor-
ing configurations, which can be transferred via a move to each other as the
move does not lead to a deterioration, are degenerate.
Then in the range of intermediate values of α, we see several structures, of
which the most interesting is the one for unselfish agents using the buy/sell-
move only: here the number of steps the simulation needs to come to an
end strongly depends on whether α, when it takes an integer value, is even
or odd. The calculation time is much larger for even integer values, as can
be seen both at the minimum and mean and maximum number of steps in
the range 2 ≤ α ≤ 18. The time is often only limited by the maximum
number of allowed steps, whereas simulations with odd integer values always
come to an end in much less than 10000 steps. The reason for this on first
sight strange behaviour is that every distance dij is counted twice in the
Hamiltonian for the unselfish agents, namely once as distance dij from i to
j and once as distance dji from j to i. Now if an unselfish node decides
to add a further edge for a cost value of α which reduces the distances of
e.g. α
2
pairs of nodes by an amount of 1, this move leads to an equally
good configuration. Thus, both this move and its inverse move are accepted,
leading to degenerate configurations between which the simulation can jump
endlessly. The final configurations of these simulation runs contain several
centre nodes, all other nodes are connected to two of these centre nodes,
which are partially connected with each other.
Such degeneracies do not occur for odd values of α, as here adding or
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Figure 2: Minimum (top), mean (middle), and maximum (bottom) number
of steps until the system reaches either a Nash equilibrium or a local mini-
mum: the results for the selfish behaviour are shown on the left, for unselfish
behaviour on the right. In each graphics, empty symbols mark results for the
“from scratch”-scenario (fs), filled symbols results for the “from complete”
scenario (fc). Results for using both moves (b/s+sw) are shown as circles,
results for using the buy/sell-move only (b/s) as triangles.
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deleting an edge leads to either a better or a worse configuration. If we had
used a factor of 1
2
with which we had multiplied the sum over the distances in
the cost function of unselfish agents, we would see degeneracies at all integer
values of α and much quicker convergence on the non-integral numbers in
between.
Sometimes we also get an increase in the calculation time at α ≈ N in the
unselfish case using only the buy/sell-move. Here some of our simulations
also run into configurations which are degenerate with their neighbors.
Please note that these times were so far given in steps. However, there
is a large difference in the computing times between simulations with selfish
agents and simulations with unselfish agents. Working with selfish agents,
only the distances from this agent to all other agents have to be determined.
Here the calculation time for a move goes with the order of O(N). For
unselfish agents, the new distances between all pairs of agents have to be
determined, such that there the calculation time goes with O(N2). Thus, we
had to spend weeks of calculation time on dozens of work stations for our
simulations of unselfish agents whereas we could perform the simulations of
selfish agents within a comparatively short time.
Next we have a look at the minimum, mean, and maximum number of
links in the final configurations, which are shown in Fig. 3. We get similar
pictures here for the various scenarios: for α < 1, we generally get completely
connected graphs with N × (N − 1)/2 edges. As we always use systems with
N = 100 nodes, this number is 4950. For large values of α, the number of
edges is always given by N − 1, such that we always have trees here. In the
intermediate regime, there is a gradual decrease of the number of edges in
the system, which is nearly monotonous. For selfish agents using both the
buy/sell-move and the switch-move, we get a large plateau for the maximum
number of links at intermediate values of α. This maximum number is given
by 196, i.e., by 2× (N −3)+2, the corresponding structure is the graph with
three central nodes which was shown in Fig. 1.
Furthermore, we are interested in the average distance between two dif-
ferent nodes in the network, which is measured in the number of hops a
message needs to get from one node to the other. Looking at Fig. 4, we find
three different regimes depending on the value of α: for small α, we always
get the completely connected graph, such that the average distance between
two nodes is 1. Increasing α, the average distance increases to a value of ≈ 2.
We get rather a plateau at this value for intermediate α. For large α, the
average distance increases again. In this regime, we find a significant differ-
ence between the simulations working both with the buy/sell-move and the
switch-move or using only the buy/sell-move: without the switch-move, the
average distance explodes with increasing α, whereas the increase is compara-
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Figure 3: Minimum (top), mean (middle), and maximum (bottom) number
of links in the final configurations
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Figure 4: Minimum (top), mean (middle), and maximum (bottom) average
distance in the final configurations
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Figure 5: Probability that the resulting configuration is a tree
tively small for those simulations in which the switch-move was implemented.
If using both moves, selfish and unselfish behaviour of the agents leads to
roughly the same average distances. But unselfish behaviour pays off if using
only the buy/sell-move.
This result can be interpreted from two different points of view: from the
point of view of a moralist, one can say that unselfish behaviour is superior
to selfish behaviour and thus leads to overall better results for all agents.
Therefore, one should never allow own egoisms to dictate the decisions one
makes. On the other hand, from the point of view of optimization, one has
to state that in the case of the unselfish agents, basically the cost function
of the overall system was considered when performing a move. Thus, every
move tried to minimize this overall cost function, whereas the selfish agents
worked only on their local part of the cost function. Therefore, from the
point of view of an optimizer, it is quite clear that unselfish optimization has
to lead to better or at least equally good solutions than selfish optimization.
Finally, we have a look at the probabilities whether the resulting configu-
ration is a tree or a star, which are shown in Figs. 5 and 6. For selfish agents,
the probability that the resulting configuration is a tree is nearly 1 at α = 2
if only the buy/sell-move is used. In this case, the probability drops to zero
if increasing α and then increases again for α ≥ 10. For α ≥ 30, it is again
equal to 1. If also using the switch-move, the probability increases from zero
to ≈ 0.75 at α ≈ 2.5, then decreases and stays at roughly a plateau of ≈ 0.6
for 3 ≤ α ≤ 10, and then increases to 1, reaching this value at α ≈ 20. The
corresponding picture for the probability that the resulting configuration is
a star is rather the same, except that the probability breaks down from 1 to
0 at α ≈ N .
In the case of unselfish behaviour, we get a different picture for these
probabilities: the probability increases from 0 to 1 in the range 2 ≤ α ≤ 50
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Figure 6: Probability that the resulting configuration is a star
with a short breakdown at α = 20. For large α, we get different results: if
using only the buy/sell-move, the probability that the resulting configuration
is a tree breaks down when α approaches N and finally fluctuates around 0.8
for large α. If also working with the switch-move, the probability stays 1.
Again the picture is the same for the probability that the final configuration is
a star except that there the probability breaks down for α > N . This decrease
is performed gradually if only the buy/sell-move is used and abruptly is both
mobes are used.
Summarizing, if a simulation run ends in a tree for α < N , then it is
always a star, whereas the probability for a star vanishes for α > N .
5 Conclusion and Outlook
In this publication, we have explored the structures generated when multiple
agents construct a computer network, within a highly simplified model of
the decisions that are made to achieve this. We find that some persistent
and rather complex structures emerge in the intermediate regimes of the
parameters that characterize the network building process. In addition to
the complete graph, and the star, the two idealized optimum solutions (the
first too expensive to be a realistic solution and the second too fragile to be
a reliable solution for a large scale network) we find trees and multi-centred
stars resulting from the process of network formulation which we simulate.
The trees are more easily formed than a star, and while loss of a single node
separates the tree into a few parts that can communicate only within each
part, there is no central site which controls all communication, as in the star.
The multi-centred star and other approximate solutions that result from the
simulations offer the germ of a more reliable approach to network formation
– no pair of sites is very far apart, and each pair can communicate over
14
multiple distinct routes.
Of course, this network creation model could be criticized in various ways
for not being close to reality: for example, the agents although trying to keep
their costs small have an infinite amount of money. Secondly, the cost for
buying a link is simply a constant and does not depend on the distance be-
tween two nodes or on the bandwidth. Here it is also unrealistic that a link
in only owned by one of the two adjacent nodes and that every node is free
to send messages via this link. Third, the bandwidth problem within real
networks is not considered at all in this model. Instead, the model empha-
sizes only the number of hops a message needs to get from the sender to the
receiver, which is often only a side-issue in real networks. Finally, the con-
figurations which emerge from this network are quite unrealistic. Especially,
the power law distribution in the connection numbers of the nodes in real
networks is not reproduced in the model.
Our most interesting result for this model is the comparison between the
outcomes of selfish or unselfish behaviours of the agents. From the point
of view of optimization, one would prefer to work with unselfish agents as
these basically consider the overall cost function of the problem, which is
to be minimized. Contrarily, selfish agents only consider some local part
of the cost function. However, working with selfish agents saves a lot of
computing time: as only the distances from one agent to all other agents
have to be evaluated for selfish agents, it takes a computing time of the
order O(N), whereas all distances have to be evaluated for unselfish agents,
taking time of the order O(N2). Moreover, even if comparing the computing
time in number of steps or of moves, the simulations with selfish agents often
outperform those with unselfish agents. If we define the quality of a network
by the average distance in hops between two arbitrary nodes, which this
network creation model attempts to optimize, we find that we get equally
good configurations for small and intermediate values of α for both types of
behaviours. Only for large α, simulations with unselfish agents lead to better
configurations. Thus, we can summarize that simulations with selfish agents
are mostly superior to simulations with unselfish agents in the way that they
lead to equally good results in much shorter computing times.
The model should serve as a starting point for future, more detailed
investigations, with more plausible models for the message traffic required,
or a more concrete description of the history and hierarchy by which the
actual Internet has been formed.
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